From: NEAL LANGERMAN <neal**At_Symbol_Here**chemical-safety.com>
Subject: FW: [DCHAS-L] CSB Releases Final Report into 2014 Mass Contamination of Charleston, West Virginia Drinking Water
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 07:51:27 -0700
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From: news**At_Symbol_Here**csb.gov [mailto:news**At_Symbol_Here**csb.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2016 7:40 AM
To: neal**At_Symbol_Here**chemical-safety.com
Subject: CSB Releases Final Report into 2014 Mass Contamination of Charleston, West Virginia Drinking Water

 

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CSB - U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD -- An independent federal agency investigating chemical accidents to protect workers, the public, and the environment

CSB Releases Final Report into 2014 Freedom Industries Mass Contamination of Charleston, West Virginia Drinking Water; Final Report notes Shortcomings in Communicating Risks to Public, and Lack of Chemical Tank Maintenance Requirements
Report Includes Lessons Learned and Safety Recommendations to Prevent a Similar Incident from Occurring

September 28, 2016, Charleston, WV, -- The CSB's final report into the massive release of chemicals into this valley's primary source of drinking water in 2014 concludes Freedom Industries failed to inspect or repair corroding tanks, and that as hazardous chemicals flowed into the Elk River, the water company and local authorities were unable to effectively communicate the looming risks to hundreds of thousands of affected residents, who were left without clean water for drinking, cooking and bathing.

The CSB's final report and recommendations will be discussed at a public meeting tonight in Charleston, WV, at 6:00 pm EDT at the Four Points by Sheraton. To watch a live webcast of the public meeting please visit this link at the time of the meeting: http://livestream.com/accounts/4761603/uschem

On the morning of January 9, 2014, an estimated 10,000 gallons of Crude Methylcyclohexanemethanol (MCHM) mixed with propylene glycol phenyl ethers (PPH Stripped) were released into the Elk River when a 46,000-gallon storage tank located at the Freedom Industries site in Charleston, WV, failed. As the chemical entered the river it flowed towards West Virginia American Water's intake, which was located approximately 1.5 miles downstream from the Freedom site.

The CSB's investigation found that Freedom's inability to immediately provide information about the chemical characteristics and quantity of spilled chemicals resulted in significant delays in the issuance of the "Do Not Use Order" and informing the public about the drinking water contamination. For example, Freedom's initially reported release quantity was 1,000 gallons of Crude MCHM.  Over the following days and weeks, the release quantity increased to 10,000 gallons. Also, the presence of PPH in the released chemical was not made public until 13 days after the initial leak was discovered.

The CSB's investigation found that no comprehensive aboveground storage tank law existed in West Virginia at the time of the release, and while there were regulations covering industrial facilities that required Freedom to have secondary containment, Freedom ultimately failed to maintain adequate pollution controls and secondary containment as required.
 
CSB Chairperson Vanessa Allen Sutherland said, "Future incidents can be prevented with proper communication and coordination.  Business owners, state regulators and other government officials and public utilities must work together in order to ensure the safety of their residents. The CSB's investigation found fundamental flaws in the maintenance of the tanks involved, and deficiencies in how the nearby population was told about the risks associated with the chemical release."
 
An extensive technical analysis conducted by the CSB found that the MCHM tanks were not internally inspected for at least 10 years before the January 2014 incident. However, the CSB report notes, since the incident there have been a number of reforms including passage of the state's Aboveground Storage Tank Act.  Among other requirements, the new regulations would have required the tanks at freedom to be surrounded by an adequate secondary containment structure, and require proper maintenance and corrosion prevention, including internal inspections and a certification process.

The CSB's investigation determined that nationwide water providers have likely not developed programs to determine the location of potential chemical contamination sources, nor plans to respond to incidents such as the one in Charleston, WV. 

Supervisory Investigator Johnnie Banks said, "The public deserves and must demand clean, safe drinking water. We want water systems throughout the country to study the valuable lessons learned from our report and act accordingly. We make specific recommendations to a national association to communicate these findings and lessons." 

The CSB report recommends that the American Water Works Association, which represents thousands of water companies, communicate the findings from the CSB report to its members and to emphasize the importance of emergency planning and coordination with other entities to ensure timely notification of the public during contamination emergencies.

The CSB made recommendations to the American Water Works Company, Inc. (AW), which owns water systems in 16 states according to its website, including West Virginia American Water in Charleston. The CSB said AW should establish nationwide requirements for all of its treatment plants to inventory potentially hazardous chemicals stored in vulnerable water source areas, assessing the dangers and developing contingency plans to respond to contamination events.  West Virginia American Water developed such a plan in June 2016 for the Kanawha Valley which the CSB recommends be modeled in the company's other plants.

The CSB's report highlights lessons learned and is calling on aboveground storage tank facilities, government officials, drinking water utilities and public health agencies across the country to follow these recommended best practices in order to prevent similar incidents.
These lessons include:  

  • Above ground storage tank owners should establish regular inspection and monitoring and coordinate with nearby water utilities and emergency response organizations to ensure that they provide adequate information about their stored chemicals for effective planning in the event of a leak.
  • State governments should act immediately to protect source waters and the public from unknown and potentially hazardous chemicals.
  • Water utilities should engage with their Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and/or State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) to obtain Tier II information. The information obtained should be used to identify water intakes that could potentially be at risk of contamination from those chemicals in the event of a spill or release.
  • Water utilities should assess the capabilities of their water treatment systems to contain potential leaks for all potential sources of significant contamination within the zone of critical concern.
  • Where feasible, water utilities should ensure laboratory testing methods are available to detect the presence or measure the concentration of potential contaminants or classes of contaminants.
  • Public health agencies should coordinate with water utilities, emergency response organizations and facilities storing chemicals near drinking water sources

Chair Sutherland said, "The unacceptable chemical contamination of the Charleston, West Virginia drinking water system could have been prevented had the lessons and recommendations in our CSB report been adopted years ago.  Public officials and water companies must work diligently to identify potential risks and assure that the public's access to safe drinking water is protected."

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.  For more information, contact Communications Manager Hillary Cohen, cell 202-446-8094 or email public**At_Symbol_Here**csb.gov

 
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